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ABSTRACT The breakthrough study of Dean et al. (Science 335:1114–1118, 2012) claimed
that imitation, teaching, and prosociality were crucial for cumulative cultural learning. None of
their child participants solved the final stage of their puzzlebox without social support, but it
was not directly tested whether the solution was beyond the reach of individual children. We
provide this missing asocial control condition, showing that children can reach the final stage
of the puzzlebox without social support. We interpret these findings in the light of current
understanding of cumulative culture: there are currently conflicting definitions of cumulative
culture, which we argue can lead to drastically different interpretations of (these) experi-
mental results. We conclude that the Dean et al. (Science 335:1114–1118, 2012) puzzlebox
fulfils a process-focused definition, but does not fulfil the (frequently used) product-focused
definition. Accordingly, the precise role of social support for the apparent taxonomic dis-
tribution of cumulative culture and its ontogeny warrants further testing.
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Introduction
A potentially defining feature of humans is the ability toproduce cumulative culture (CC), a key factor differ-entiating us from non-humans (Richerson and Boyd,
2005; Tennie et al., 2009; Tomasello et al., 1993; Whiten, 2017,
but see Claidière et al., 2014; Jesmer et al., 2018; Sasaki and Biro,
2017; Schofield et al., 2017), and a phenomenon resulting from a
nexus of capacities that are believed to be more developed in
humans compared to other species, such as language, prosociality
or perspective-taking (Tomasello, 2019). Currently, there is no
widely agreed-upon definition of CC, a situation which—as we
show below—has major implications for both the design and
interpretation of experimental findings. Yet, with an increasing
number of experimental studies on the social and cognitive
processes underlying CC in humans and non-human animals
(Caldwell and Millen, 2008; Caldwell et al., 2012; Claidière et al.,
2014; Dean et al., 2012; Derex et al., 2013, 2019; Derex and Boyd,
2015; Fay et al., 2019; Jesmer et al., 2018; Mcguigan et al., 2017;
Reindl et al., 2017; Sasaki and Biro, 2017; Schofield et al., 2017;
Wasielewski, 2014; Zwirner and Thornton, 2015), researchers
have highlighted the need for conceptual refinements and clar-
ifications (Caldwell et al., 2016; Charbonneau, 2018; Mesoudi and
Thornton, 2018; Miton and Charbonneau, 2018; Reindl et al.,
2017; Schofield et al., 2017). One factor that has contributed to
misunderstandings and disagreements regarding what constitutes
CC, and to what extent it can be found in non-human animals, is
the fact that the term “cumulative culture” is used to refer to both
cultural products (i.e., behaviour or products of behaviour) and
processes (i.e., cumulative cultural learning, cumulative cultural
evolution; Tennie et al., 2018; see Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018,
for an overview of current definitions of CC)1.
For some researchers, CC describes a process of a gradual
increase in the efficiency and/or complexity of a cultural trait
through repeated innovation and transmission events (often over
generations; Dean et al., 2014; Mcguigan et al., 2017; Mesoudi and
Thornton, 2018; Schofield et al., 2017). Within this framework,
the actual level of efficiency/complexity of the final product
resulting from such a process is not relevant for determining
whether the process is deemed cumulative. Therefore, we will
refer to this definition as process-focused (Fig. 1a). For example,
Schofield et al. (2017) suggested that food-washing behaviours in
Japanese macaques has increased in efficiency over a period of 60
years and might thus represent a case of cumulative cultural
evolution in non-human primates. The question of whether the
most efficient observed technique of food-washing—digging a
separate pool of water for rinsing potatoes—could have been
invented from scratch without dependency on the older, less
efficient techniques—was therefore not decisive for the authors’
conclusion for CC. Another example is the increase in flight
distance of paper planes that has been observed in transmission
chain experiments with human adults (Caldwell and Millen,
2008, 2009): while the authors acknowledge that the flight dis-
tances achieved at the end of the transmission chains could also
have been reached by a few individuals without the opportunity
of social learning within the experiment, they argue that the
observed increase in flight distance, via cycles of learning and
innovation, validate the experiment as a laboratory model of
cumulative cultural evolution. Such process-focused definitions of
CC correspond to the recently defined “core criteria” of CC by
Mesoudi and Thornton (2018).
In contrast, other researchers, in addition to describing CC as a
process of gradual increase in the efficiency/complexity of a
cultural trait, require the efficiency/complexity of the trait (i.e.,
the product of this gradual increase) to go beyond the limits of
what any individual of the species could re-innovate from scratch
(i.e., on their own; Aplin, 2019; Boyd and Richerson, 1995; Boyd
et al., 2011; Charbonneau, 2015; Henrich and Tennie, 2017;
Miton and Charbonneau, 2018; Reindl et al., 2017; Richerson and
Boyd, 2005; Tennie et al., 2018, 2009; Tomasello et al., 1993; Vale
et al., 2017; Fig. 1b). We refer to this definition as product-focused.
While for product-focused researchers the criterion of the trait
being highly likely to be impossible to innovate by a single
individual is a necessary part of the definition of CC, process-
focused researchers would see this as an additional feature that
only some cumulative cultural products possess (Mesoudi and
Thornton, 2018). Note that while we claim that scholars generally
fall into one of these categories of defining CC (and some may use
both, see e.g., Fay et al., 2019, 2018), we do not suggest that either
of these definitions is currently commonly accepted or that one is
followed by the majority of researchers in the field.
It has become increasingly clear that CC is not—and should
not be regarded as—a unitary phenomenon (Mesoudi and
Thornton, 2018). It is likely that with regard to the debate over
whether or not CC is unique to humans, researchers may agree
that non-human animals possess CC under a process-focused
definition, while (according to current evidence) it seems to be
restricted to the human species under a product-focused defini-
tion (or Mesoudi and Thornton’s (2018) “extended criteria”).
Nevertheless, we argue that the lack of clarity (until recently) in
using definitions of CC has led researchers to drastically different
interpretations of experimental studies aiming to simulate
cumulative cultural evolution and learning, resulting in a need to
discuss and consolidate the different interpretations. In order to
advance our understanding of CC, explicit definitions are
required, as they directly influence study design: different defi-
nitions will require different methods and criteria for validation.
A question for which this problem has become pronounced is
whether young children are also capable of cumulative cultural
learning or whether this is the preserve of adults (Dean et al.,
2012; Mcguigan et al., 2017; Reindl and Tennie, 2018). As we will
argue, and in line with the above, the answer depends on which
definition is used.
In the search for possible social and cognitive requirements for
cumulative cultural learning, researchers have proposed a series
of socio-cognitive processes that—on their own or in conjunction
with other factors—might be necessary for CC (Biro et al., 2003;
Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1995; Coussi-Korbel and Fragaszy,
1995; Galef, 1992; Giraldeau and Lefebvre, 1987; Hrubesch et al.,
2009; Laland, 2004; S. Reader and Laland, 2001; Tennie et al.,
2009; Tomasello, 1996, 1999). In 2012, Dean et al. published a
paper that was the first to experimentally investigate—within a
single study (and across species)—the role of the eight proposed
contributing processes at the time: teaching, imitation, prosoci-
ality, language, attention to low-ranking innovators, as well as the
extent of scrounging, conservatism, and monopolisation of
resources by dominant individuals. To examine which of these
factors might underlie CC (as a process), the authors presented
groups of human children (3 to 4 years of age), chimpanzees, and
capuchin monkeys with a novel task, which they termed the
“cumulative culture puzzlebox” (Dean et al., 2012, p. 1115) and
whose three increasingly reward-providing stages had to be
opened sequentially. Dean et al. (2012) found that five of the eight
groups of children (each comprising 4 to 5 individuals) contained
at least two children who reached the third, i.e., final, stage of the
puzzlebox. Crucially, while reaching the final stage, and in con-
trast to the capuchins and chimpanzees who did not reach this
stage (apart from one chimpanzee), the children made use of
three of the eight investigated socio-cognitive processes: teaching,
imitation, and prosociality. In contrast, children who received no
such social support from other children in their group (“naturally
occurring” asocial controls) did not solve the third stage. This
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0483-7
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2020) 6:106 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0483-7 | www.nature.com/palcomms
pattern led the authors to conclude that these three “aspects of
human social cognition are directly responsible for the cumula-
tive cultural capability” (ibid., p. 1117).
Dean et al.’s (2012) systematic, multidimensional cross-species
approach was a major step forward in the field and their puz-
zlebox has been accepted as an empirical test for cumulative
cultural learning in young children. However, for researchers
using a product-focused definition of CC, the conclusions of the
Dean et al. (2012) study fall short. From the product-focused
perspective, in order for the Dean et al. (2012) puzzlebox to be
regarded as assessing cumulative cultural learning, its final solu-
tion would have to lie beyond the innovative capacities of indi-
vidual children who do not have access to factors such as
imitation, teaching, and prosocial acts. In other words, solving all
stages of the box has to be shown to require high-fidelity social
learning and hence to represent a “culture-dependent trait”
(Reindl et al., 2017) via explicit testing using an appropriately
powered asocial control condition (Tennie et al., 2009; see Ban-
dini and Tennie, 2018 for a guideline on how to establish that a
given trait is a culture-dependent trait). At the time, due to the
“naturally occurring” asocial controls in the Dean et al. (2012)
data (see above), an additional asocial control condition of chil-
dren attempting the task individually was deemed unnecessary.
However, while the “naturally occurring” asocial controls in the
original study are one form of asocial control condition, for
product-focused researchers (Mcguigan et al., 2017; Reindl et al.,
2017; Vale et al., 2017) they cannot substitute for running a
condition with individually-tested participants. First, although the
“naturally occurring” asocial control children did not receive
teaching, instruction, or prosocial donation of rewards to scaffold
Fig. 1 The two main ways of defining cumulative culture (CC). The line drawings (culminating in “stars”) represent cultural traits increasing in efficiency/
complexity. a The process-focused definition describes CC as a gradual increase in the efficiency/complexity of a cultural trait; the product of such a
process is called a cumulative cultural product, regardless of whether the product can be re-innovated by a single “naive” individual (illustrated by the
dashed line). Examples for process-focused CC are the increased flight distance of paper planes over transmission chains of human adults (Caldwell and
Millen, 2009) or the improved food-washing behaviours in Japanese macaques (Schofield et al., 2017, both examples lie possibly below the dashed line,
i.e., both can potentially be re-innovated by naive individuals) or a bow and arrow (above the dashed line, probably too complex to be re-innovated from
scratch by a single human). The area below the dashed line is equivalent to Mesoudi and Thornton’s (2018) core criteria CC, the area above is equivalent to
their extended criteria. Core criteria CC is characterised by increases in the learnability of a trait or changes towards a fixed, local optimum (e.g., artificial
languages becoming more easily learned (Kirby et al., 2008), pigeon flying routes increasingly approaching optimum (Sasaki and Biro, 2017)), while
extended criteria CC is open-ended (e.g., many technological products such as ever-improving computers). b In the product-focused definition a process/
product is labelled as cumulative only when the product of the process is beyond what any “naive” individual could reinnovate from scratch (i.e., it needs to
lies above the dashed line; e.g., bow and arrow). Here, cultural traits that may be individually innovated (such as the paper planes or the food-washing
behaviours) are not CC (labelled by some instead as latent solutions (Tennie et al., 2009)). For product-focused researchers, CC is inherently open-ended
(Tennie et al., 2018, like Mesoudi and Thornton’s (2018) extended criteria of CC). Here, increases in the learnability of a trait or changes towards local
optima of the trait resulting in products that remain within what naive individuals can re-innovate do not constitute CC, but have been called step-wise
traditions (Tennie et al., 2009). Note that the term CC only applies to the level of a species or population, but not to the level of an individual. The labels
that relate to the level of the individual are those introduced by Lev Vygotsky: the “Zone of Actual Development” (describing what an individual is already
capable of doing by themselves) and the “Zone of Proximal Development” (describing what an individual can acquire through social learning). For further
discussion on how the Vygotsky’s concepts relate to CC, see Reindl et al., 2018).
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their learning, they may still have observed the task-behaviour of
others; thus, we cannot assume that they count as a pure asocial
baseline— such a condition is included by design, not deduced a
posteriori. Second, the number of these children was, overall,
small (n= 11)— creating a need for an appropriately powered
baseline condition. Third, the lack of social support provided by
others (through teaching/prosocial donation of rewards) to these
children could have been due to unidentified cues stemming from
these “naturally occurring” control children themselves (e.g.,
being generally uninterested in the task), which itself could be the
hidden causal link to their lack of progression in the task. Finally,
opportunities to reach the final stage of the task may be higher in
an individual baseline condition compared to a group context
where individuals necessarily face competition for task access.
Overall, there is a need for a dedicated asocial control condition
(baseline).
If asocially tested children (baseline) proved able to reach the
final stage of the task, this would mean that (1) this task could not
be considered a “culture-dependent” trait (sensu Reindl et al.,
2017) for young children and also that (2) the conclusion of the
original study—that imitation, teaching, and prosociality are
important for children’s cumulative cultural learning—would
have been demonstrated only for a context fitting the process-
focused definition of CC. To what extent imitation, teaching, and
prosociality are important (or even necessary) for a context that
fits the product-focused definition would remain to be empirically
demonstrated. For example, Reindl et al. (2017), who endorsed a
product-focused view of CC, showed that imitation was not
necessary for young children to copy a culture-dependent trait.
Here, we provide the asocial control condition (baseline) required
to determine whether the full solution of the task also fulfils the
product-focused definition of CC. We present children with the
Dean et al. (2012) puzzlebox in a truly asocial context, while at
the same time aiming to sufficiently motivate children to interact
with the box. Thereby, we can determine whether the failure of
the “naturally occurring” asocial control children in Dean et al.
(2012) to reach the final stage of the puzzlebox was really due to a
lack of social support or whether a lack of motivation could have
been a potential reason.
Materials and methods
We matched our design to the original Dean et al. (2012) study,
but made some changes to increase suitability for testing children
individually (see below). Pilot trials with five children, conducted
between December 2016 and February 2017, checked for the
appropriateness of the trial length and overall practicality of the
procedure.
Participants. The final sample consisted of 35 children (age
range= 40 to 59 months, Mage= 51.5 months, SD= 5.3 months)
from nine schools and nurseries (see Table S1 for participant
characteristics). The sample size of 35 was chosen to match the
sample used by Dean et al. (2012). This age group was chosen by
the authors of the original study because (1) children of this age
have not entered the formal schooling system in the UK yet, thus
possessing reduced experience with teaching compared to older
children, and (2) because children that age do not possess as
much general knowledge yet as older children, thus making the
creation of a task that could be a candidate for a culture-
dependent product for children more practical. We tested an
additional 20 children but had to exclude them due to a script
change (n= 3), experimenter error (n= 7), disruption of the trial
by another person (n= 3), or because they fell outside the
required age range (n= 7). Only those children whose parents
opted to return completed consent forms participated. All
children were given stickers in reward for participation. Children
were allowed to keep all stickers won during their trial; unsuc-
cessful children received six stickers, including two Stage 3 stick-
ers (see below for information on the different kinds of stickers).
Ethical approval was received from the STEM Ethical Review
Committee at the University of Birmingham.
Materials. We used a warm-up game in order to familiarise
children with the testing situation and the experimenter. This was
a selection of 15 letter and number dominoes (34 × 50mm) from
the Toys “Я” Us Universe of Imagination Froggy Dominoes Set
(Supplementary Fig. S1). Children were encouraged to put the
dominoes in numerical order, spell their name, or put the frogs in
a queue and knock them over. While Dean et al. (2012) did not
include a warm-up session, we deemed this an important part of
the current study as children were tested individually and thus
might have been more socially inhibited compared to a group
testing situation.
For the experiment, children were tested individually in an
asocial baseline condition on the same puzzlebox used by Dean
et al. (2012). The puzzlebox is symmetrical, consisting of three
stages on each side yielding progressively more desirable reward
stickers through interaction with the puzzlebox controls (doors,
buttons, and dials; Fig. 2). It had two symmetrical, independently-
controlled sides and children could solve the stages on either or
both of these sides (Supplementary Fig. S2). We used the same
stickers as used in the original study (Supplementary Table S2).
We used three stopwatches to measure overall trial duration, as
well as to independently time the rebaits on either side of the box
(see below for details on the rebait procedure). Trials were filmed
on a Sony HDR-CX330E Handycam mounted on a tripod in a
fixed position diagonally behind the participant (Supplementary
Fig. S3).
Procedure. Children were tested between March and July 2017 at
nurseries and primary schools in West Midlands, England. At
each site, a testing location was chosen where other children
could not observe the experiment, either in a shielded area of the
classroom or another room within the school or nursery. Tea-
chers were asked to prevent participating children from observing
others’ trials and from interacting with other participants before it
was their turn.
Children were tested individually, in contrast to the group
condition used by Dean et al. (2012). Each child participated in
one 20 min trial (i.e., the maximum amount of time pilot trials
Fig. 2 Participant interacting with puzzlebox. Four-year-old boy solving
the third stage (right side) of the Dean et al. (2012) puzzlebox.
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indicated individual children would remain interested in the box.
Note that due to practical limitations we gave children less time/
opportunity to interact with the puzzlebox than in the original
study in which each group received five trials of 30 min each, and
that the current study was therefore arguably more conservative).
All participants were tested by the same female experimenter (E)
using the same procedure. A member of nursery staff was present
in the testing room when required by the host institution but was
asked not to interact with the child during the trial. Teachers
made brief encouraging comments in six trials but these did not
corrupt the procedure as the comments resembled the general
encouragement comments made by E.
Children were brought individually to the testing area by a
member of school staff or E. The child and E sat together at one
side of the table and played the warm-up game. During this time,
the puzzlebox was on one side of the table, with the front visible
to the participant. After a few minutes, the warm-up game was
put away and the puzzlebox was moved to the centre of the table
(Supplementary Fig. S3). E introduced the puzzlebox and
explained that there were three different kinds of stickers in the
puzzlebox for them to win. Children were shown the stickers and
told that they got better and better (as they increased in size; see
Table S2). Before starting the trial, E sat behind the puzzlebox.
She then asked the child to try and win some stickers and started
the first stopwatch. The full instructions are shown in Table S3.
During the trial, children could manipulate the puzzlebox
controls (doors, buttons, and dials) without restriction. This
matched the “open” condition in Dean et al. (2012). Participants
were asked not to look in the top or back of the puzzlebox. When
a child solved a stage and retrieved a sticker, they were requested
to put it in a plastic cup. They then continued to try and win
more stickers. Details of the trial procedure are shown in
Table S4.
Each child participated in a single trial. A trial ended when the
main stopwatch reached 20 min (n= 14), when a child solved
Stage 3 for the second time (n= 7), when children stopped
engaging with the puzzlebox despite prompting (n= 13) or when
the child became upset (n= 1). Children needed to reach Stage 3
only once to be scored as having solved the full puzzlebox;
however, we continued the trial until they reached Stage 3 for the
second time or 20 min were over. This was done to demonstrate
that the solution was repeatable once learned individually.
Trial durations were measured from the video data. Mean trial
duration was 12.94 min (SD= 7.36, range: 1.68–20.78 min). If a
child was engaged in an action at the end of a trial, E waited for
the child to finish that action (n= 4). Experimenter error when
setting the stopwatch led to one trial ending 47 s late. See Table S5
for categorised trial durations.
Matching the procedure in Dean et al. (2012), the puzzlebox
was rebaited intermittently throughout the trial (2 min after the
first task manipulation and 2 min after each rebait). During a
rebait the puzzlebox controls (door, button, and dial) were reset
to the start position and stickers that had been won were
replenished. Rebaits on each side of the puzzlebox were timed
independently, using separate stopwatches. For each side, a rebait
happened 2 min after the first manipulation of any control at this
side following the trial start and then 2 min after the first
manipulation following each rebait. This matched the Dean et al.
(2012) procedure and allowed children to solve stages of the
puzzlebox multiple times. See Supplementary Fig. S4 for a
detailed timeline of the rebait procedure.
Coded video data indicated that some rebaits had not been
timed accurately. This occurred for various reasons, such as
participant manipulations delaying rebaits, errors in identifying
first manipulations and multiple demands on E’s memory and
attention. However, out of the 303 times that the puzzlebox was
rebaited, there were only 6 instances (2%) in which rebait time
was more than 50% (60 s) different to the target rebait time of
2 min. It is difficult to hypothesise how rebait time errors could
have affected performance. Rebaiting too early may have enabled
children to win more stickers over the course of their trial but
could also have impeded their progression to higher puzzlebox
stages. For example, if they were returned to the start from Stage
2 prematurely, it could take longer to reach Stage 3. Longer rebait
times might have had the reverse effect. As the vast majority of
rebait times was 2 min, we estimate potential effects of these few
longer rebait times to have had a negligible effect. Dean et al.
(2012) encountered similar difficulties so it is unlikely that the
comparison between the two samples was compromised by these
errors.
Statistical analysis. We recorded trial duration, maximum stage
reached, and number of stickers won at each stage. Statistical
analyses were computed using IBM SPSS Statistics 24.
All data were coded by one of the authors. An independent
second rater, naive to the study aims, coded a random 25%
selection of the videos (nine videos; 136.17 min). The second
coder recorded the number of times participants reached each
stage. There was perfect agreement between the two coders
(k= 1, SE= 0, p < 0.001).
We first checked whether there were effects of sex and age on
stage reached. We used a two-tailed Mann–Whitney U-test to
analyse the difference in maximum stage distribution between
boys (n= 14) and girls (n= 21) and found no difference
(U= 151.5, z= 0.167, p= 0.881). We analysed the relationship
between age and maximum stage reached using a one-tailed
Spearman’s r and found no relationship (rs(33)= 0.62,
p= 0.362).
With regard to the comparison of the results of our sample
with the results of the original study (both n= 35) we used a one-
tailed Mann–Whitney U-test to analyse the difference in median
stage reached between samples; we used a one-tailed test as we
hypothesised that if there was a difference between the samples in
stage reached, then the children working in groups should show
better performance as they could benefit from social learning and
prosociality. We used a two-tailed Chi-square test to test for a
difference in proportion of children reaching Stage 3 in
each study.
We used a two-tailed Chi-square test to compare the
proportions of children reaching Stage 1 or higher between both
studies.
We also compared our participants with those children in the
original study who did not receive any social support: we analysed
the difference in median stage reached between all our
participants (n= 35) and those participants of the original study
identified as receiving no social support (“naturally occurring”
asocial controls, n= 11) using a two-tailed Mann–Whitney U-
test. We used a two-tailed test as we did not have a directed
hypothesis as to why one group should outperform the other
(given that all children did the task without social support).
Results
Our key research question was whether any child could solve all
three stages of the puzzlebox on their own, i.e., without demon-
strations or support from others, thus lacking any of the formerly
claimed cognitive factors considered necessary for task success
(Dean et al., 2012).
Can children solve the puzzlebox on their own? We found that
individual children could solve all three stages of the puzzlebox
without help: 9 out of the 35 tested children reached the third,
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final stage of the puzzlebox at least once, and 7 of these 9 children
reached this third stage twice within their trial (the maximum
number possible by our design). Our results show clearly that the
trio of socio-cognitive processes (teaching, imitation, and proso-
ciality)—while certainly helpful—is not necessary for children of
this age to solve this particular puzzlebox (which is thus incon-
sistent with the product-focused definition of CC).
Comparison of the current results with the Dean et al. study
Average performance. We analysed whether children in the ori-
ginal study on average reached higher stages of the puzzlebox
than children in the current study. We hypothesised that if there
was a difference between the two samples, then the children
working in groups (in Dean et al., 2012) should show higher
average performance than baseline children (the current study) as
they could benefit from teaching, social learning, and prosociality.
Indeed, the median stage reached by the individual children
tested in the current study (mean rank= 30.16) was significantly
lower than that reached by children tested in groups in the ori-
ginal study (one-tailed Mann–Whitney U-test, mean
rank= 40.84; U= 425.5, z=−2.32, p= 0.02, η2= 0.078; Fig. 3).
However, we found no difference in the number of children
solving Stage 3 between both studies (two-tailed Chi-square test
of independence, χ2= 2.283, p= 0.13, φ= 0.181). Working in
groups therefore increased children’s performance overall (con-
sistent with the process-based definition of CC), but did not make
them more likely to solve the final stage of the puzzlebox.
Solution of Stage 1 or higher. We also compared both studies
with regard to the proportion of children who were able to
reach Stage 1 or higher as opposed to those children being “stuck”
on Stage 0. We found that the proportion of children who
reached Stage 1 or higher (Dean et al.: n= 27; current study
n= 16) compared to those children who remained at Stage 0
(Dean et al.: n= 8; current study n= 19) was significantly larger
in the Dean et al. (2012) than in the current study (two-tailed
Chi-square test of independence, χ2= 7.295, p= 0.007,
φ= 0.323), suggesting that social support helped children in
being at least minimally successful at the task.
Comparison with “naturally occurring” asocial controls.
Finally, we compared performance of children in the current
study (N= 35) with those children in Dean et al. (2012) who were
identified as receiving “no social support” when interacting with
the puzzlebox, despite being tested in a group (n= 11).
First, we compared whether these two samples differed in the
maximum stage reached using a two-tailed Mann–Whitney U-
test; we found no difference in the distribution of stage reached
between the current sample and the Dean et al. (2012) “no social
support” children (U= 231, z= 1.103, p= 0.333, η2= 0.026).
Second, we compared whether these two samples differed in
the proportion of children reaching Stage 3 (vs. Stage 2 or lower).
In Dean et al. (2012), none of the 11 “no social support” children
reached Stage 3, whereas nine children in the current study did
so. Despite this numerical difference, a two-tailed Fisher’s exact
test showed that there was no difference between the studies
regarding the proportion of these children reaching Stage 3
(p= 0.064, φ= 0.277). These two analyses suggest that there was
no difference between the performance of our individually tested
children and those who received no social support in Dean et al.
(2012). Two further analyses regarding the latency to reach
Stage 3 can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Discussion
Our main finding was that 9 (26%) of the 35 children we tested in
an asocial learning control condition reached the final stage of the
Dean et al. (2012) puzzlebox. This was despite them having had
less potential time to interact with the puzzlebox (20 min) com-
pared to the original study (5 trials of 30 min) and them being in
a more unusual testing situation (1:1 situation with an unfamiliar
adult), which might have affected some children’s motivation.
Our results demonstrate that the trio of socio-cognitive processes
(teaching, imitation, and prosociality), while facilitating, was not
necessary for children’s success. Following a product-focused
definition (Boyd and Richerson, 1995; Richerson and Boyd, 2005;
Tennie et al., 2009; Tomasello et al., 1993), the conclusion is that
cumulative cultural evolution was not simulated in Dean et al.
(2012) because our results show that the product in question
(solving all stages of the puzzlebox) was not dependent on any
social factors, including social learning, teaching, and prosociality.
However, as the groups tested in Dean et al. (2012) showed better
performance overall compared to the asocially tested children in
Fig. 3 Percentage of children reaching each stage of the puzzlebox (shown: maximum stage solved). In blue are the results of the current study (children
tested individually; one trial of maximum 20min per child); in orange are the results of the original study by Dean et al. (2012), where children were tested
in groups of four or five (5 trials of 30min per group). Numbers above the bars represent the number of children reaching each maximum stage in the
respective study. Total sample size in each study was 35.
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the current study, the Dean et al. (2012) puzzlebox does still fulfil
the process-focused definition of CC. We conclude that this
puzzlebox is invalidated as a proxy for product-focused cumula-
tive cultural learning for 3- to 4-year-old children, in part possibly
also because the task lacks open-endedness (see also Charbon-
neau, 2015; Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018). However, this task
remains a valid simulation of CC under the process-based defi-
nition of CC, and may most appropriately be considered as a task
illustrating the complexity of a relatively simple ratcheting task
for preschool children (i.e., a task whose solution is not culture-
dependent (sensu Reindl et al., 2017; see also Miton & Char-
bonneau, 2018, for a discussion on how task complexity affects
the ecological validity of and conclusions from laboratory
experiments on cumulative cultural evolution).
Children tested in groups showed on average better perfor-
mance than asocially tested children, and further analysis suggests
that social support may have been important in enabling indi-
viduals to actually begin a seemingly complex task, rather than in
ratcheting up their initial solution(s) (Fig. 3). Therefore, the
performance difference between the two studies might largely be
due to a social facilitation effect (Zajonc, 1965) rather than due to
social learning opportunities per se (see also Miton and Char-
bonneau, 2018): being in a group might have made children more
motivated to approach and explore the puzzlebox (although we
note that the converse is also true, e.g., some groups invented an
alternative game instead of attempting the puzzlebox).
Our findings indicate that the correlation found by Dean et al.
(2012) between children’s performance and the use of teaching,
imitation, and prosociality does not hold in a product-focused
cumulative cultural context. Indeed, some have suggested that
imitation may actually not be necessary for young children to
copy a culture-dependent product (Reindl et al., 2017), and the
experimental adult literature still debates the roles played by
imitation and (imitation-based) teaching in cumulative cultural
learning (Caldwell and Millen, 2009; Wasielewski, 2014; Zwirner
and Thornton, 2015). Rather, product-focused researchers may
now conclude that Dean et al. (2012) demonstrated that some of
the socio-cognitive processes claimed to be important or neces-
sary for CC are important for tackling a complex, non-culture-
dependent (sensu Reindl et al., 2017) ratcheting task. This is
perhaps not surprising as there is no reason to assume that those
socio-cognitive processes that are argued to support the emer-
gence of culture-dependent traits do not also facilitate the
emergence of traits where the problem faced is difficult (though
not impossible) to solve asocially (see the predictions of the costly
information hypothesis, Kendal et al., 2009).
At first sight it might seem that researchers endorsing the
process-focused definition of CC could do without an asocial
control condition as we used in the current study: an accumu-
lation in the efficiency and/or complexity of a trait in the
experimental condition would seem to suffice to label the
observed process CC. However, omitting asocial control condi-
tions can lead to “false positives”, i.e., to the conclusion that one
has identified a cumulative cultural process where in fact there
was none. For example, in studies exploring the subtractive
ratchet effect (Tennie et al., 2014; see also McGuigan and Graham,
2009) chains of children that were seeded with a particularly
inefficient way of carrying out a certain task (e.g., carrying rice
from location A to B, opening a puzzlebox) showed an
improvement over generations in their efficiency, which might
seem like a cumulative cultural process. However, only a com-
parison with control groups could show that the behaviour at the
end of the chains was not more efficient than what individual
children could reinnovate without any demonstration. Thus, this
process was a mere recovery from a seeded inefficient technique
to baseline performance—a special kind of ratchet effect, but
probably not a process most researchers endorsing either defi-
nition of CC would regard as a cumulative cultural process
(especially because the improvements were not based on social
transmission but on the absence of copying, as children had to
refrain from copying the inefficient technique in order to become
more efficient). Therefore, regardless of the definition of CC one
endorses, any experimental study on cumulative cultural evolu-
tion should include an asocial control condition in order to avoid
such false positives.
This paper highlights the need for considering different defi-
nitions of CC in the field of cultural evolution in general
(alongside Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018; Miton and Charbon-
neau, 2018) and, specifically, regarding the question of whether
non-human animals and human children are capable of cumu-
lative cultural learning. Here, we do not endorse one CC defini-
tion over the other, as our study was never designed to decide
between or test these definitions. Perhaps the most important
implication of our results is that the question of whether groups
of young children can already produce culture-dependent traits
(sensu Reindl et al., 2017) themselves and—if so—whether the
skills and motivation for imitation, teaching, and prosociality (or
other factors) are necessary for children to do so, requires
renewed investigation—using tasks whose solutions are beyond
what can be achieved individually by the subjects in question. We
already know that children readily copy culture-dependent traits
even when not explicitly asked to do so (Reindl et al., 2017). With
regard to producing culture-dependent traits, a promising start
has already been made (McGuigan et al., 2017; Reindl and Ten-
nie, 2018) but more research is essential for the development of
appropriate tasks (Miton and Charbonneau, 2018). Such tasks
can be identified by administering candidate tasks to a large
number of participants tested in asocial conditions (for extended
time periods), which will delineate the asocial learning perfor-
mance of a given study group (as we did here). If the solution to a
task is not spontaneously reinnovated by any of the participants
in this baseline (Bandini and Tennie, 2018; Reindl et al., 2017;
Tennie et al., 2009), investigations may progress. We further
suggest that demonstration of product-focused CC (or extended
criteria CC, Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018) should focus upon
open-ended tasks rather than those with a priorily known optimal
solutions. This is especially important as it has been suggested
that open-endedness might be a key difference in the cultural
evolution of humans and non-human animals (Charbonneau,
2015; Tennie et al., 2018). Yet note that open-endedness is a
feature of the process, not of the product, of cumulative cultural
evolution. Therefore, it is vital for our understanding of what
makes CC unique in humans to not only focus on cumulative
cultural products (e.g., whether they increase in efficiency, whe-
ther they are beyond what any individual can reinnovate) but to
also study the nature of the process itself (see e.g., Charbonneau,
2015).
CC is a hallmark of our species that has allowed us to populate
almost all habitats on the planet and even to venture into space
(Henrich, 2015). More clarity in the use of definitions and experi-
mental tasks is essential if we want to further our understanding of
the roots of human cultural success. One of the major questions to
be answered is whether CC also exists in any non-human animals.
So far, CC has been viewed as a unitary phenomenon (and a
potential rubicon between humans and non-humans; see also
Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018); however, it is likely that for this
question the answer likewise depends on the definition. We may
find that (some) species have CC under a process-based definition
(or core criteria CC, Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018), while human
culture may be unique in fulfilling also the product-based definition
(or extended criteria CC, Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018). In order to
study this possibility, explicitly definition-matched tasks that are
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appropriate for comparative empirical research are required. Our
findings thus pave the way for a more robust investigation of
whether the other-regarding socio-cognitive capacities identified by
Dean et al. (2012) explain the difference between human and non-
human cultural achievements and, if so, when and why these
capacities may have evolved and when they appear ontogenetically
in humans.
Data availability
The datasets generated during the current study are available in
the OSF repository, https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/TRG3V.
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Notes
1 Similar issues of whether a phenomenon in question is defined as a process or a
product have been encountered, e.g., by innovation researchers (innovation as a
product that is novel to the group vs innovation as a process that is novel to the
individual; Carr et al., 2016; Reader and Laland, 2003).
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